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The public sector has been used for different purposes in different contexts. This has 
ranged from being an instrument for learning and technology absorption (with greater 
or lesser success) as in Taiwan and Malaysia, to an instrument for job creation and 
political stabilization. Even in some of the relatively successful cases like Malaysia, 
both functions have sometimes been combined.  
 
The effectiveness of public sector management has often been stud ied using principal-
agent models, and presented as an information and incentive problem. However, the 
great variance in public sector performance suggests that we also need to look at the 
political constitution of the state. The example of the East Asian newly industrializing 
countries suggests that countries where the state has effective powers to regulate have 
relatively well working public sectors, but their private sectors also work well. 
Conversely, countries where the public sector performs very poorly also have poorly 
working private sectors. This observation is not surprising in one sense, but it has 
important policy implications. However, the incentive and information issues are also 
important, but an excessive focus on these problems can cloud more important 
problems that have to do with political failures of regulation.  
 
Instead of looking at the performance of the public sector in successful countries, we 
can get a different set of insights by looking at the public sector and privatization 
strategies in a more typical developing country, Bangladesh, which went through a 
massive privatization programme from the mid 80s onwards. In the early seventies 
Bangladesh went through a period of populism which saw more than 90% of large-
scale industry being nationalized. The main impact of this nationalization was largely 
employment generation, and the beneficiaries were mostly middle and lower-middle 
class supporters of the regime, though blue-collar workers also benefited to a lesser 
extent. From the late seventies, under military regimes, a process of privatization was 
begun, and this accelerated dramatically in the early eighties. Before the collapse of 
the Eastern bloc, Bangladesh was the largest privatization experience.  
 
The operation of the public sector and its subsequent performance after privatization 
gives us important insights into the nature of the problem facing industrialization 
strategies in poor countries. I collected data on the jute industry during my PhD and 
subsequently have worked on this industry. Jute is a natural product that makes a 
coarse fabric used in sacking, carpets and wall coverings. It has low value-added, but 
with investment, it could move into higher value-added products that could capture 
the environmental- friendly market that has been developing over the last few decades. 
In Bangladesh, however, the jute industry has been stuck in the low end of the product 
line, and the example of privatization shows the limitations of this approach for 
addressing the important issues of technology acquisition and learning.  
 
The jute industry is interesting because while all of it was nationalized in 1972, in 
1982 half of the mills that had previously been owned by Bengalis were privatized, 
leaving the rest in public ownership. This created a unique opportunity to observe the 
relative performance of the two sectors over time, and I have been doing this for the 
last two decades in an ongoing research project. 
 
The story can be broken into three periods. In all three periods, the major effect of 
privatization, and indeed the exclusive focus of policy-makers, was on employment 
rather than on technological improvements, and this has a significant effect on the 
outcomes observed.  
 
The first period that we looked at was 1983-1988. The results were used in my PhD 
dissertation and some of it was later published in the AER as a joint paper. The 
immediate impact of privatization was indeed on employment because the primary 
purpose of nationalization in 1972 was indeed to create jobs for key constituencies of 
the regime. With privatization, the new private owners had the incentive to dispose of 
excess labour, and a military regime provided cover for this strategy. As we expected, 
the major losers were white collar workers, because excess employment had been 
greatest in this sector. Manual workers did not suffer an equivalent loss in jobs but 
they suffered a loss in conditions as many were converted from permanent to casual 
status, with lower pay and little employment protection. 
 
By the end of this period, the newly privatized mills had shed largely white collar 
workers, and relative to them, the public sector maintained excess employment to the 
tune of 30% for the white collar category. But the private sector did not shed a 
significant number of blue-collar workers suggesting that excess employment was not 
so significant for this category.  
 
The story becomes even more interesting in the next period that covers 1988-94. 
During this period output of jute manufacturing contracted by around 20% as 
Bangladesh lost market share to India and other jute manufacturing countries and 
world demand remained stagnant. The World Bank became involved in a Jute Sector 
Restructuring Programme in Bangladesh, giving a loan to assist the reduction of 
subsidies to the sector. This was interpreted to mean further job reductions, which 
though they were important, diverted attention from the more difficult task of raising 
technology quality and moving up the product chain. 
 
The result was that over 1988-94, the public sector followed the private sector in 
shedding white collar jobs. The excess employment in the white collar category 
declined over this period from around 30% to around 10%, while excess employment 
of manual workers virtually disappeared. Effectively, employment in the private 
sector served as a yardstick for public sector managers and for international agencies, 
and this information reduced the bargaining power of some key sections of employees 
in the public sector. This allowed attractive severance packages to be offered to white 
collar employees, and this resulted in rapid job reductions in the public sector. 
 
The final period, 1994 to today shows the limitations of this strategy of privatization. 
The focus on employment ignored both wider issues of static efficiency, as well as the 
critical issue of technology and dynamic efficiency. On static efficiency, it ignored 
other forms of rent-capture other than excess employment. At the same time as the 
public sector responded to pressures for cutting white collar employment, the 
aggregate loss of the public sector relative to the private sector stayed constant despite 
the apparent reduction in excess employment. This suggests that other forms of rent-
extraction continued and became stronger as excess employment of white-collar 
workers was reduced. This most likely took place through greater extractions by 
management and their political bosses.  
 Most critically, the reform process did not address the issue of technological 
upgrading and productivity growth through the production of upstream products. In 
this, Bangladesh possibly lost an opportunity to take the lead in using jute in the niche 
environmental markets that could support higher value-added products.  
 
The effects of this began to become obvious in our last period. More than half of the 
private sector firms closed down despite their improvements in productivity due to 
labour shedding. Production shifted to India and other competitors of Bangladesh. 
The public sector lost its largest firm, the vast loss-making Adamjee Jute Mills.  
 
The World Bank had not only ignored dynamic viability, it had ignored the political 
mechanisms through which the public sector had maintained its loss-making potential 
while losing labour, thereby being able to produce cheaper products than the private 
sector. In an unusual step, in 1996 the private sector appealed to the Inspection Panel 
of the World Bank to investigate the terms and the implementation of the Jute Sector 
Adjustment Credit. The Panel confirmed that despite claims to the contrary by the 
World Bank management, the private jute manufacturing sector had indeed suffered 
adversely and Bank management had not followed Bank policies in the design and 
implementation of the Credit. However, the Inspection Panel decided not to 
recommend any further investigation or remedy on the grounds that the loan period 
was almost over and a new loan was not envisaged. 
 
This unhappy episode is unfortunately quite common in the privatization that is going 
on in developing countries. It identifies two key issues that are ultimately closely 
related. First, the reasons that public enterprises fail are closely connected to politics, 
and this failure has multiple manifestations even in terms of static inefficiency, not 
just excess employment. Second, the most important failure is in technology policy, 
which requires appropriate incentive and enforcement capacities on the part of the 
state, that in turn require appropriate political conditions for their implementation. For 
the state to have pushed the adoption of technological improvements in the jute sector 
would in the short term have required more subsidies not less, but also harsh 
enforcement conditions and penalties for non-performers. These capacities were not 
identified nor were the appropriate political conditions created simply through the 
privatization programme. I think these lessons have broader applicability in poorly 
performing developing countries where the reform of the public sector is high on the 
agenda. 
 
 
